Part 1: "Flashpoint North: Mosul Before the Storm"

Article 1 of 3 in our Battle of Mosul (2004) Series

Background on Mosul’s Strategic Importance

A Northern Crossroads of Conflict

Mosul sat at a critical juncture—where Iraq’s northern oil fields, Kurdish-administered territories, and Sunni Arab heartlands converged. This geographic location made it a natural battleground for competing interests. As Iraq’s third-largest city, Mosul wielded immense influence over the political and military balance in the north.

A City of Diverse—and Divided—Peoples

Home to a complex mosaic of ethnic and religious groups, including Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, and Shabaks, Mosul was never easy to govern. Its social fabric, frayed by decades of repression and mistrust, made it a flashpoint for sectarian grievances. Any power shift—whether political or military—risked rippling across the region.

Map showing Mosul and its proximity to Fallujah and other important Iraqi cities

Strategic Value to Both Sides

For the U.S. military and the newly formed Iraqi government, controlling Mosul was vital. The city’s position along the Tigris River made it essential for maintaining supply routes and projecting authority in the north. But for insurgents, Mosul offered something just as valuable—a symbolic and operational prize. Capturing the city would deal a blow to coalition morale, provide access to weapons and manpower, and fuel narratives of resistance.

Kurdish-Iraqi Political Dynamics

A City Still Haunted by Arabization

Mosul’s demographic fault lines were carved long before the U.S. invasion. Under Saddam Hussein’s Arabization campaigns, Kurds had been displaced, marginalized, and stripped of political influence in cities like Mosul. After 2003, they sought to reclaim lost ground—both geographically and politically. Backed by the powerful Kurdish Peshmerga and political factions in Erbil, Kurdish leaders aimed to reestablish a foothold in Mosul, particularly in eastern neighborhoods and government positions.

Flag of Kurdistan that is often associated with Peshmerga fighters

Arab Resistance and Kurdish Suspicion

But this resurgence was met with deep suspicion by many Sunni Arabs, who viewed Kurdish expansion as a threat to their historical dominance. The fear of marginalization, combined with resentment over past grievances, created a volatile atmosphere. Many Sunni Arab residents accused the Kurds of attempting to alter the city’s identity and demographics through political maneuvering and security pressure.

A Fractured Security Apparatus

Mosul’s internal security structure only deepened these divisions. The Iraqi Police, undermanned and undertrained, were often viewed as infiltrated by insurgent sympathizers. Meanwhile, Kurdish Peshmerga units—though better trained and equipped—were not universally accepted, especially in Arab-majority areas. Their presence in mixed neighborhoods often inflamed tensions rather than eased them.

Sgt. David Mitts, of Warrenton, Oregon, scans a wall opening during a combat patrol in Mosul on November 14. He serves with 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

U.S. Forces Walking a Tightrope

American units like the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment (part of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team) were caught in the middle. These forces depended heavily on Kurdish intelligence and combat support, particularly when Iraqi police faltered. Yet every move had to be calculated to avoid appearing partial. Backing the Kurds too overtly risked alienating Sunni Arab allies and deepening the insurgency.

In this politically combustible environment, every patrol, checkpoint, and arrest carried potential to spark unrest. The fault lines were not just ethnic—they were strategic. And the fighting that would soon erupt would test the delicate balance that U.S. forces had struggled to maintain.

24th Infantry Regiment insignia

U.S. and Iraqi Army Posture Ahead of Fallujah

Strategic Shifts Before the Storm

In early November 2004, as U.S. Central Command focused its might on retaking Fallujah, military resources were reallocated across Iraq. Mosul—though vital—was deprioritized in terms of reinforcement. The expectation was that existing forces could hold the line in the north while the primary effort unfolded in the west.

3/1 Marines clearing streets in Fallujah

Who Was Left to Hold Mosul?

Responsibility for Mosul’s security fell largely on elements of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment and 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, both part of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team under the 2nd Infantry Division. These units were backed by elements from the 1st Cavalry Division, as well as local Iraqi Army and police forces. But it wasn’t enough.

The Iraqi police, in particular, were in no shape to weather a sustained assault. They were undermanned, poorly trained, and riddled with both fear and infiltration. Reports circulated of insurgent sympathizers within the ranks, and loyalty to the new Iraqi government was anything but assured.

Soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment patrol the streets of Mosul, Iraq, on November 28, 2004 (AP)

Warnings Ignored

Several commanders raised red flags. Intelligence suggested insurgent cells were lying low in Mosul, awaiting the right moment. Concerns that a large-scale operation in Fallujah could leave other cities vulnerable went largely unheeded. With combat-hardened U.S. units funneled into Anbar Province, cities like Mosul were dangerously exposed.

An Opportunity Not Missed

Insurgents in Mosul didn’t need a formal signal—they saw the shift in posture and acted quickly. What followed in the coming days would validate every concern U.S. commanders had voiced. Mosul was about to erupt, just as Fallujah went up in flames.

Pfc. Jose Ruiz, a New York City native with the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, keeps watch over Mosul from a rooftop during a combat mission on November 14, 2004

The Trigger: How the Fallujah Assault Sparked Uprisings in Mosul

November 8 — The Match Is Lit

The U.S. assault on Fallujah began on November 8, 2004. As the operation unfolded in Anbar Province, insurgent commanders elsewhere saw their opening. Within 72 hours, Mosul—several hundred miles to the north—erupted in a wave of violence that shocked coalition planners. Insurgents launched a synchronized offensive, targeting critical infrastructure, seizing police stations, ambushing U.S. patrols, and cutting off key bridges across the Tigris.

Collapse of Local Security

What made Mosul’s uprising particularly alarming was the collapse of its internal security forces. Many Iraqi police units, already compromised or demoralized, simply abandoned their posts—some out of fear, others in open sympathy with the attackers. The sudden vacuum allowed insurgents to occupy wide swaths of the city with minimal resistance. American Stryker units, spread thin across multiple sectors, found themselves scrambling to contain a rapidly deteriorating situation.

Armed Iraqi fighters run across a street in Mosul, Nov 2004 (AFP)

A Calculated Counterstrike

This was no impulsive act of rebellion. The timing was deliberate. The insurgency's plan was to stretch U.S. forces to the breaking point: draw attention away from Fallujah, fracture Iraqi confidence, and prove that even the north wasn’t secure. The fall of Mosul—even if temporary—would undermine claims of progress and hand insurgents a symbolic and strategic victory.

Two Cities, One Firestorm

As the Marines and soldiers of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Cavalry Division fought block by block in Fallujah, the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment and 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment found themselves in a parallel urban nightmare in Mosul. While Fallujah grabbed headlines, Mosul became the insurgents’ counter-narrative—proof that Iraq’s chaos was far from under control.

A Stryker vehicle rolls through the streets of Mosul as Soldiers from the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), based out of Fort Lewis, Washington, carry out a combat patrol targeting anti-Iraqi forces on November 14, 2004

The Collapse of the Iraqi Police in Mosul

Mass Desertions Undermine Security

The uprising in Mosul exposed the fragile state of Iraq’s security apparatus. Within the first 48 hours of the coordinated insurgent offensive, more than a dozen police stations were abandoned or captured. In several districts, entire police units laid down their weapons and disappeared—either out of fear or in quiet support of the insurgency.

A Vacuum of Authority

This sudden collapse left large swaths of the city unguarded. Government buildings, bridges, and major intersections fell quickly. Armed insurgents moved freely through neighborhoods, encountering minimal resistance. The absence of law enforcement created chaos and allowed insurgents to consolidate control with terrifying speed.

Spc. Jared Davis, from Lake Oswego, Oregon, moves through the streets of Mosul during a combat operation on November 14, 2004. He serves with the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

U.S. Forces Thrust into the Breach

American forces, originally positioned to advise and support Iraqi police, were now thrust into frontline combat. Units like 1-24 IN and 3-21 IN transitioned from mentorship roles to full-scale urban warfare, often operating with limited intelligence and under constant ambush. The sudden need to retake key infrastructure—without reliable Iraqi partners—stretched U.S. troops to their limits and forced the coalition to reassess its entire approach in the north.